Silent Invasion: An Investigation into China, Russia, and the West’s Shadow War for Africa’s Sahel

The arid expanse of the Sahel has become the theater of a quiet but high-stakes geopolitical struggle. In recent years, a “Great Game” is unfolding across West and Central Africa, pitting emerging powers like China and Russia against France and its Western allies. At stake are vast mineral riches – from gold and uranium to critical green energy metals like cobalt and lithium – and strategic influence over a region beset by conflict and coups. This investigative report examines the fundamental drivers of this contest, the sentiments fueling local support or resentment, and the global impact that could reshape energy security and power balances. We draw on UN and NGO reports, on-the-ground news investigations, and leaked intelligence to reveal evidence of foreign involvement behind military takeovers, infrastructure deals, and information wars. We also assess how France’s role has evolved after losing footholds in its former colonies, and what this silent scramble means for future conflicts. Finally, we consider strategic implications for countries like Indonesia in the global green energy market.

Key Actors and Their Agendas

China: Infrastructure, Loans and Critical Minerals

China has emerged as a dominant economic force in sub-Saharan Africa, pursuing a strategy of infrastructure-for-resources diplomacy. Through President Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has poured massive loans and investments into African roads, railways, ports and power projects . Since the early 2000s, China has spent over $155 billion in Africa, creating new markets for Chinese companies and providing an alternative to Western financing . In resource-rich nations, these loans are often secured by long-term concessions for oil, minerals, and mining rights – a modern twist on “infrastructure colonialism.”

A prime focus is placed on critical minerals essential for high-tech and green energy. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – home to 63% of global cobalt production in 2019 . Chinese firms have aggressively invested in the DRC’s cobalt and copper belt, to the point that Chinese state-owned enterprises control about 80% of DRC’s cobalt output . Of the world’s 10 largest cobalt mines, half are owned by Chinese companies . This dominance in cobalt (used in lithium-ion batteries) underscores Beijing’s strategic grip on supply chains for electric vehicles and renewables. It is a similar story with lithium: Chinese mining giants have acquired major stakes in Zimbabwe’s lithium fields and are building processing plants .

In West Africa’s Sahel, China’s presence is growing via infrastructure and mining deals. For example, Chinese firms built railway links in Nigeria and Ethiopia under BRI and invested in oilfields and mines in Niger and Chad. Beijing often portrays its role as win-win development, focusing on roads and dams rather than overt political meddling. However, the heavy debt burdens of BRI loans have raised concerns about undue influence over African governments. In countries like Zambia and Angola, China has at times leveraged debt for access to mining revenues and strategic assets. Sentiment on the ground is mixed – many Africans appreciate the new infrastructure, but there are worries about opaque deals and labor practices. Western critics have even dubbed some arrangements “debt-trap diplomacy,” though African leaders often reject that label.

Importantly, China’s push intersects with Africa’s mineral wealth. The Sahel nations hold some of the world’s largest untapped reserves of gold, uranium, bauxite and iron (see map above). For instance, Mali is Africa’s third-largest gold producer and has attracted Chinese mining interest in addition to Western firms. Niger, the world’s seventh-biggest uranium producer, is another focal point – Chinese companies operate one of Niger’s largest oil blocks and have shown interest in its uranium mines alongside France . In Sudan, Chinese state firms long invested in oil and recently in gold, operating even amid sanctions. China’s principle of “non-interference” means it works with whichever regime is in power, civilian or junta, often securing resource deals irrespective of governance concerns. Fundamentally, Beijing’s goal is to lock in energy and mineral supplies for its industries while expanding geopolitical influence across Africa’s strategic belt .

Russia: Wagner’s Shadow Wars and Junta Alliances

Russia’s role in Africa has been markedly different – leaner in economic clout than China, but muscular in security influence. Moscow’s playbook relies on the Wagner Group, a private military company (PMC) with Kremlin ties, to project power via unconventional means. Under the banner of counterterrorism or regime protection, Wagner mercenaries have deployed to Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya and beyond. In exchange, Russian companies often receive mining concessions (gold, diamonds) or lucrative contracts, blurring the line between military and economic influence . This “guns for gold” strategy has made Wagner a kingmaker for embattled regimes and military juntas in the Sahel.

In Mali, after a 2020 coup strained relations with France, the junta invited Wagner forces to fill the security void left by departing French troops. By 2022, an estimated 500 Russian mercenaries were operating in Mali alongside the army. Almost immediately, reports emerged of Wagner involvement in brutal counterinsurgency operations and human rights abuses . French forces, upon withdrawing, even caught Wagner red-handed in an information warfare stunt: drone footage showed white mercenaries burying bodies near Gossi base to frame France for “mass graves” . The French military declassified the video evidence, exposing what it called an “information attack” orchestrated by Wagner to discredit France’s Barkhane mission . This incident highlights Russia’s use of deception and propaganda to supplant French influence – a tactic the Kremlin has refined across the region.

Russia has also courted popular sentiment in Africa by tapping into anti-colonial anger. Disinformation networks linked to Wagner have flooded social media in West Africa with narratives painting France as a neo-colonial exploiter and Russia as the anti-imperialist savior . These campaigns, spread via Facebook, Telegram and local influencers, have been surprisingly effective. After the July 2023 coup in Niger, for example, thousands of Nigeriens rallied in the capital waving Russian flags and even attacked the French embassy in Niamey . Russian-linked online operatives actively stoked this unrest: leaked analyses show Wagner-affiliated groups had twice tried to spark a coup narrative in Niger earlier, priming public opinion against then-President Bazoum . When the real coup happened, Yevgeny Prigozhin (then Wagner chief) publicly hailed it, and Wagner channels urged Niger’s new junta to kick out the French and embrace Moscow . Wagner disinformation amplified fears of an impending ECOWAS invasion and spread fake news (like claims of French troops massing in Senegal) to rally Nigeriens behind the putschists . This manipulation of local sentiment – blending real grievances with fabricated ones – has helped Russia win support among populations that feel betrayed by their former Western partners.

On the political front, Russia has forged close ties with the string of military juntas that now form a “coup belt” across the Sahel. In Mali (2020, 2021 coups), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023), new military leaders have all pivoted away from France and toward alternative partners. The Wagner Group has positioned itself as a ready ally – providing personal security to leaders, training local forces, and conducting clandestine combat operations that regular Russian forces cannot. In CAR, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government is essentially propped up by Wagner units, who received diamond and timber rights in return . In Sudan, Wagner mercenaries have reportedly advised and armed the RSF paramilitary in exchange for access to gold mining (helping Moscow skirt international sanctions). And in Burkina Faso, the junta of Captain Ibrahim Traoré has openly welcomed Russian involvement – recently granting a new gold mining license to Moscow-linked firm Nordgold as part of a broader pivot “away from traditional Western allies towards Moscow”.

Russia’s fundamental aim is to build a sphere of influence by undermining Western presence and cultivating dependent regimes. Leaked U.S. intelligence documents in 2023 revealed that Wagner planned to create a “confederation of anti-Western states” across Africa . The three Sahel juntas (Mali, Burkina, Niger) have since formed the Alliance of Sahel States, a mutual defense pact that pointedly excludes France and aligns implicitly with Moscow’s orbit . Moscow’s gambit is largely opportunistic: with relatively modest investments (a few thousand mercenaries, arms shipments, and online trolls), it has achieved outsized influence over resource-rich territories and diplomatic loyalties (e.g. favorable votes at the UN from African partners). The sentiment it exploits is genuine – many Africans are weary of decades of French military presence and perceive Russia as a counterbalance. Yet the impact of Wagner’s involvement often proves toxic: instead of stabilizing conflicts, their heavy-handed tactics can fuel further violence, while regimes propped up by mercenaries tend to delay any return to democracy, inviting international isolation. The recent demise of Prigozhin and uncertain future of Wagner forces adds a wild card – but Russia’s engagement in Africa is likely to continue via other channels, given the strategic footholds established.

France and the West: Fading Neo-Colonialism and Intelligence Gambits

France, the onetime colonial master of much of the Sahel, finds itself on the defensive. For decades after African nations gained independence, Paris maintained deep influence through “Francafrique” – a web of military bases, pliant regimes, currency controls (the CFA franc), and preferential access to resources. In Niger, for example, French company Areva/Orano has mined uranium for France’s nuclear reactors for nearly 50 years, supplying a quarter of Europe’s uranium needs . France also stationed thousands of troops across the region, often intervening militarily (over 50 times since 1960) under security pretexts. However, this paternalistic role has engendered growing resentment. Anti-French sentiment has surged as local populations accuse Paris of expropriating resources and propping up corrupt elites. French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged in 2023 that some criticisms of France’s “outsized role” and lingering colonial attitudes are valid .

In recent years, France’s clout has visibly eroded. The turning point was the failure of its flagship counterinsurgency mission, Operation Barkhane, which deployed up to 5,100 French troops to fight Islamist militants across Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania . Despite tactical victories, by 2021 the Sahel’s security situation remained extremely fragile, and France had lost patience with what Macron called “no end in sight” to the mission . In June 2021 – just days after Mali’s second coup – Macron announced Barkhane would be wound down . By early 2022, France began withdrawing troops from Mali after a public spat with the coup leaders (who brazenly brought in Wagner). The power losses cascaded: French forces were kicked out of Mali and later Burkina Faso, and in 2023 the new regime in Niger formally ordered France to pull its 1,500 troops out as well . The departure of French bases marked the end of an era – Paris’ once-unchallenged security role in West Africa had been dismantled by a wave of coups and popular protests.

In response, French foreign policy has been forced into a reset. Macron has tried to recast France as an equal partner rather than a patronizing overlord – speaking of “humility” and reducing the French military footprint. Diplomatically, France now emphasizes working through regional and multilateral bodies (the EU, ECOWAS, United Nations) rather than unilateral action. For instance, when Niger’s elected president was ousted, France backed ECOWAS sanctions and threats but avoided any direct intervention that could echo colonial-era expeditions . Paris also doubled down on soft power and intelligence operations to counter rival influence. A special unit in the French foreign ministry now maps and debunks Russian/Wagner disinformation networks, having tracked about 100 accounts spreading anti-French propaganda . French officials candidly admit that hostile actors (chiefly Moscow) have “amplified criticisms of France and presented Moscow as an ally”, exploiting real grievances to damage France’s image . By exposing fake news (such as a recent video fabricated to blame France for an attack on Chinese miners in CAR ), France hopes to repair trust in African publics. Still, officials acknowledge that not all anti-French anger is engineered – “some criticisms are true,” as even Macron conceded .

The United States and other Western nations are also active, albeit less conspicuously. The U.S. has focused on counter-terrorism training and intelligence support in the Sahel, building drone bases (like the $100 million Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger) and deploying special forces. Ironically, many of the coup leaders toppling pro-Western governments were themselves trained by the U.S. and allies. American officers mentored soldiers like Col. Assimi Goïta of Mali and Col. Mamady Doumbouya of Guinea, who attended U.S.-led military exercises in 2019 . At least five of the Nigerien officers behind the 2023 putsch had participated in U.S. training programs . Washington has been alarmed by this unintended “coup academia” – a Pentagon spokesperson stressed that American courses “always [teach] principles of democratic civilian control” , and yet the reality “looks bad” . The U.S. and France now face a dilemma: whether to cut off all military aid to junta-ruled countries (as laws often require) or find ways to stay engaged to prevent an even greater Russian/Chinese fill. So far, responses have varied – from withholding aid and visas to junta leaders, to quietly maintaining counter-terror cooperation where possible (as the U.S. initially did in Niger before the situation deteriorated).

From a fundamental perspective, Western powers want to protect their economic interests and security goals in Africa. This includes safeguarding access to resources (like France’s uranium or the West’s investments in African oil), containing Islamist terrorism (which could spread if Sahel states collapse), and checking the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in a region considered strategically important. The sentiment challenge for the West is regaining trust: many African youths see Western involvement as neo-colonial and hypocritical, especially when contrasted with China’s promise of no political strings or Russia’s anti-colonial rhetoric. Western diplomats have started engaging more with African civil society and youth, trying to shake the image of only dealing with aging elites. Yet as France’s experience shows, reversing decades of perceptions is an uphill battle.

Finally, Western intelligence operations in the region, while covert, have been significant. France’s DGSE and the U.S. CIA are reported to have had informant networks inside Sahel governments and militant groups. They’ve provided crucial intel for operations like the French raid killing jihadist leader Abdelmalek Droukdel in Mali (2020). There are also rumors of cloak-and-dagger activity, such as sabotage of Wagner’s weapons convoys or influencing of election outcomes, though concrete evidence is scarce publicly. What is clear is that a shadow war of influence is in full swing – Western agencies versus Russian political technologists and Chinese state media – all vying to shape African hearts and minds.

Behind the Scenes: Economic and Military Power Structures

The rivalry in Africa unfolds not through open warfare between great powers, but via behind-the-scenes economic leverage, military partnerships, and proxy forces. Each actor has built a distinct power structure:

• Chinese Economic Leverage: China’s power structure in Africa is primarily financial and commercial. Beijing’s policy banks (China Eximbank, China Development Bank) issue billions in low-interest loans to African states for infrastructure, often secured by commodities. Chinese SOEs then build the roads/ports and receive mining rights or profit-shares in return. This creates a cycle of dependency: countries owe debt to China and commit future output of oil or minerals as repayment. Large Chinese diaspora communities manage retail and construction sectors in many African capitals, extending influence on the ground. In mining, Chinese companies frequently enter joint ventures with African state companies – providing capital and technology in exchange for majority ownership. For instance, in Congo’s cobalt belt, Chinese firms formed joint ventures with the government-owned Gécamines, allowing them to dominate output . Another tool is resource-backed infrastructure deals: e.g. a Chinese consortium builds a railway or hydro dam, and is repaid in long-term extraction of bauxite or cobalt. This model has given China control of strategic chokepoints in supply chains – from minerals (cobalt, lithium, manganese) to logistics (the ports of Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, Djibouti). It’s notable that 35 out of 78 major Chinese-built ports in Africa are in West Africa , highlighting interest in the Atlantic coast (where Europe and Americas trade routes converge). Militarily, China has a lighter footprint – it opened its first African military base in Djibouti in 2017 and contributes troops to UN peacekeeping missions, but prefers to wield influence through economic might rather than boots on the ground.
• Russian “Security for Resources” Model: Russia’s influence structure revolves around security agreements and private military deployments. With limited aid or investment to offer, Moscow trades hard security – counterinsurgency assistance, arms deliveries, personal protection for leaders – in return for soft power and resource access. The Wagner Group acts as a quasi-deniable arm of the Russian state, allowing the Kremlin plausible deniability while expanding influence. Wagner’s tentacles include companies like Meroe Gold and Lobaye Investthat manage mining permits in Sudan and CAR, effectively looting gold and diamonds that help fund its operations (and by extension, Russia’s war chest) . There is also an information warfare arm (often referred to as the “Prigozhin troll farm” network) that handles propaganda and election interference, as seen in Madagascar, Libya, and several West African states . Politically, Russia has cultivated ties with African militaries through training programs and defense pacts – for example, hosting African officers at Moscow’s academies and signing agreements at biennial Russia-Africa summits. It capitalizes on institutions like the Soviet-founded Peoples’ Friendship University (Patrice Lumumba University) which has a network of African alumni. The cumulative effect is a patronage web: African juntas and strongmen get military aid and regime security; in return, they grant Moscow-friendly contracts and diplomatic alignment (such as voting against Ukraine resolutions at the UN). This informal empire is held together by mercenary force and elite bargains, and can be unstable – dependent on continuing goodwill of authoritarian leaders and the profitability of resource concessions.
• Western Military-Intelligence Footprint: Western nations, especially the U.S. and France, leverage formal alliances and covert capabilities. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) based in Stuttgart oversees a network of at least a dozen U.S. outposts in Africa, including drone bases in Niger (Niamey and Agadez) , special forces operating from Burkina Faso and Cameroon, and naval surveillance from the Gulf of Guinea. The U.S. and EU also fund training missions (like the EU’s EUTM Mali) that embed mentors in local armies. While these programs aim to professionalize African militaries, they also extend Western influence within defense establishments. Intelligence-sharing cells in capitals like Niamey and N’Djamena have given Sahel governments access to American and French surveillance data on jihadist movements – a key leverage point (junta leaders risk losing intel support if they fully break with the West). Economically, Western influence comes via multinational corporationsand financial institutions. Companies like TotalEnergies (oil in Nigeria, Angola), BP, Barrick Gold (gold mines in Mali), Rio Tinto (iron ore in Guinea) and others represent billions in investments. Western governments often lobby on their behalf and use tools like export credit agencies or World Bank loans to secure favorable business climates. Moreover, the CFA franc currency used by 14 West and Central African countries, though recently reformed, remains pegged to the euro under French Treasury backing – a monetary structure critics say gives Paris undue say over African economies. This system, however, is now under threat as countries like Mali and Burkina consider dropping the CFA for alternatives amid nationalist sentiment.
• Local Power Brokers: It’s important to note that African actors are not mere pawns – they have their own agency and play external powers against each other. Sahelian juntas have learned to hedge their bets: for instance, Mali’s Colonel Goïta engaged Turkey and the UAE for drones and financial deals to avoid over-reliance on Russia . Niger’s junta has held talks with both U.S. and Russian envoys, indicating they want leverage to extract concessions from each. Civil society movements also influence outcomes – e.g. mass protests in Burkina Faso against French troops hastened France’s exit in 2023. Ethnic and regional dynamics within countries further complicate how foreign support is perceived (a group marginalized by a French-backed regime might welcome a Russian-backed coup, and vice versa). So the power structures are not monolithic; they are part of a complex chessboard of African politics, where foreign powers provide new moves but local actors determine the endgame.

Strategic Mineral Assets: Mines, Contracts and Control

At the heart of this struggle are strategic mines and minerals that are increasingly valuable in the world economy. Below is a list of key resource sites in the Sahel/Sub-Saharan region and who effectively controls them:

• Imouraren Uranium Mine (Niger): One of the world’s largest uranium deposits (estimated 200,000+ tonnes). French nuclear firm Orano held the mining permit, but Niger’s 2023 junta revoked Orano’s license in 2024, citing unmet development plans . Niger produces about 4% of global uranium, and with France’s influence waning, Russia’s Rosatom has expressed keen interest in taking over Imouraren . Orano is now exploring an exit as Russian firms are “at liberty to submit offers” for its Niger assets .
• Somair Uranium Mine (Niger): An open-pit mine in Arlit operated since the 1970s. Orano owned 63% (state-owned Areva’s legacy) until the junta seized control in late 2023 . The government detained Orano’s local director and took over day-to-day running of Somair amid accusations of unpaid taxes and environmental harm . Niger’s leaders have since invited Russian and other foreign investors to modernize uranium production – a stark shift from France’s decades-long dominance.
• Loulo-Gounkoto Gold Complex (Mali): A pair of large gold mines (over 500,000 oz annual output) in western Mali. Canada’s Barrick Gold owns 80%, with the Malian state holding 20% . This site exemplifies how juntas are challenging Western miners: in 2023 Mali’s government suspended Barrick’s export rights and even seized ~3 tons of its gold by helicopter, alleging tax underpayment . Several Barrick staff were detained on charges the company calls baseless . Mali’s new mining code demands higher state revenue, and the standoff saw Barrick halt operations for months . The dispute is ongoing, but it highlights the nationalist push to renegotiate terms with Western firms – or force them out if they refuse local demands.
• Bissa-Bouly Gold Mines (Burkina Faso): Open-pit gold mines formerly run by Nordgold, a Russian-linked company. Nordgold has operated in Burkina for years and, under the Traoré junta, its position strengthened. In 2023–2025, Burkina’s government nationalized two other gold mines (Boungou and Wahgnion, previously owned by Canada’s Endeavour Mining) via a state firm SOPAMIB , then granted Nordgold an industrial license for the new Niou gold project . Under that deal, “Jilbey Burkina” (Nordgold’s subsidiary) holds 85% and the state 15% free carried . This points to Moscow gaining a favored investor status as Burkina pivots away from French and Canadian companies . With gold prices high, the junta is leveraging Russian ties to bolster an economy hit by insurgency .
• Essakane Gold Mine (Burkina Faso): The country’s largest gold mine (approx. 400,000 oz/year), operated by Canada’s IAMGOLD. Essakane has long been a pillar of Burkina’s output (which totaled 57 tonnes in 2023) . Though not overtaken yet, IAMGOLD and other Western operators are in the sights of the regime. Officials have hinted at revisiting terms or involving new partners . Given the trend, Russian or state-backed entities could seek stakes if IAMGOLD divests. (Notably, Russia’s Nordgold was previously a major producer in Burkina and could be a candidate to acquire mines if Western firms retreat.)
• Manono Lithium Deposit (DRC): Outside West Africa but critical to note, Manono in the DRC’s Katanga region is among the world’s largest untapped lithium deposits. It has been the subject of a ownership tussle between Australian interests and Chinese firms. Ultimately, a Chinese mining giant (Zijin Mining) gained a significant share, aligning with China’s strategy to control lithium supply like it does cobalt . While DRC is Central Africa, the control of Manono affects global EV battery supply and shows the extendable template that could apply if lithium is found in Sahel countries (geological surveys in Mali and Niger have hinted at lithium and rare earth prospects).
• Cobalt-Copper Mines of Haut-Katanga (DRC): Key sites include Tenke Fungurume (major copper-cobalt mine) and Mutanda – both once owned by Western firms but now under Chinese companies (China Molybdenum and others). As noted, Chinese entities control roughly 80% of DRC’s cobalt production and refining , meaning they indirectly control the flow of cobalt used by Western battery makers. This is strategic even for Sahel countries: for example, Congo’s cobalt travels by road/rail to ports that China has stakes in (like Lobito), and disruptions could reverberate in battery factories from Europe to Asia.
• Arlit Integrated Uranium Sites (Niger): Apart from Imouraren and Somair, Niger’s Arlit region housed the now-closed Cominak mine (Akouta deposit), which was another Areva/Orano-run venture until exhaustion in 2021. The closure left Somair as France’s last foothold. Now, with Orano sidelined, there are reports that Niger may partner with new players (possibly Russian or Chinese) to revive or expand uranium extraction . This is crucial as Niger’s high-grade uranium was historically strategic for European energy security.
• Syama Gold Mine (Mali): An industrial gold mine in southern Mali, operated by Australia’s Resolute Mining. The Malian junta detained Resolute’s local director in 2022 until the company agreed to a new mining convention . Resolute and others (B2Gold, Hummingbird) have since largely acceded to Mali’s tougher terms. While not (yet) taken over by any foreign rival, it illustrates how juntas are using strong-arm tactics (including arrests and legal threats) to squeeze more benefits from foreign miners . This may either lead to more equitable deals – or prompt Western companies to divest, opening the door for non-Western firms to step in.

In summary, the control of Africa’s mines is in flux, shifting with the geopolitical winds. Where once French or other Western firms had near-monopoly in Francophone Africa’s resources, now Russian and Chinese companies are picking up stakes – whether through governments’ deliberate reallocation (as seen in uranium and gold deals) or through market acquisitions. African governments themselves are asserting greater control: Burkina Faso’s creation of SOPAMIB to nationalize mines and Mali’s new 2023 mining code (giving state up to 35% ownership of mines) are signs of a resource nationalism uniting many of these countries. The big question is whether these states will partner with new powers (Beijing, Moscow) under more favorable terms, or if they will simply trade one form of exploitation for another.

Coups and Unrest: A Decade of Foreign-Fueled Upheaval

The past ten years have seen a cascade of coups across the Sahel and surrounding regions – often with foreign fingerprints in the background. Below is a chronology of major power seizures and the suspected external influences involved:

• Mali, 2012: Soldiers led by Capt. Amadou Sanogo topple the government, citing failures against a Tuareg rebellion. U.S. Connection: It emerged Sanogo had received extensive U.S. military training (six training missions in the U.S.) prior to staging the coup . The coup unintentionally facilitated a jihadist takeover of northern Mali, prompting France’s 2013 Operation Serval intervention. Foreign Impact: France re-established a presence to combat militants, effectively becoming kingmaker in Bamako’s politics thereafter.
• Central African Republic, 2013: A rebel coalition (Séléka) ousts President Bozizé. Bozizé was a French security partner; after his fall, France intervened (Opération Sangaris) but eventually pulled out in 2016 amid criticism. Russia’s Entry: By 2017–18, Russia moved in, providing weapons and Wagner instructors to the CAR’s new government. In return, Russian firms got diamond and gold concessions. This coup thus opened CAR to Russosphere influence that persists today .
• Burkina Faso, 2014: Popular uprisings force out long-ruling Blaise Compaoré (a staunch French ally). A 2015 attempted coup by Compaoré loyalists fails due to mass resistance and lack of French support. Outcome: Burkina transitions to elected government, but instability simmers.
• Sudan, 2019: Longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir is overthrown by the army after nationwide protests. Competing foreign interests surface: Gulf states (UAE, Saudi) back the military council with aid, while Russia’s Wagnerreportedly advises Bashir’s security until the end, then pivots to courting new generals. A civilian-military power-sharing begins, only to be undermined by a coup in Oct 2021 led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (supported quietly by Egypt). Foreign Role: Russia had promised Sudan a Red Sea naval base and kept close ties with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Gen. Hemedti; after 2021, both Burhan and Hemedti sought external backing (Egypt for Burhan, UAE/Russia for Hemedti), contributing to Sudan’s descent into civil war in 2023.
• Mali, August 2020: Col. Assimi Goïta and fellow Malian officers depose President Ibrahim B. Keïta amid street protests over corruption and insecurity . Notably, Goïta had trained with U.S. Special Forces (Flintlock exercises) and worked closely with French troops in joint operations. Post-coup: Under ECOWAS pressure, a civilian interim government is formed but proves short-lived. May 2021: Goïta mounts a second coup, ousting the interim president and installing himself as head of state . Foreign Role: Goïta’s junta swiftly tilts to Russia – expelling French ambassador and inviting Wagner – marking a strategic win for Moscow. France withdraws troops by 2022 amid hostile relations .
• Chad, April 2021: President Idriss Déby is killed on the battlefield against rebels. The army violates the constitutional succession by installing his son Mahamat Déby as interim president, with tacit backing from France (which viewed the Déby regime as a lynchpin against regional terrorism). Though not a classic coup, this dynastic military handover drew zero Western punitive action – a contrast to how ECOWAS/Westsanction other putsches. The double-standard fueled perceptions of neo-colonial bias (France supporting a friendly autocracy).
• Guinea, September 2021: Col. Mamady Doumbouya, a Special Forces commander, seizes power from President Alpha Condé. External Links: Doumbouya had received training from both U.S. Green Berets and the French military, even participating in U.S.-led drills months before turning on Condé . After taking over, he cited Condé’s corruption and aligned Guinea more with other francophone juntas. Notably, Doumbouya attended Russia’s 2023 St. Petersburg Africa summit, signaling an openness to Moscow, but he has also maintained relations with China (renegotiating a major bauxite-for-infrastructure deal with a Chinese firm). Guinea’s coup thus appears non-aligned, playing all sides.
• Burkina Faso, January 2022: Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba ousts President Roch Kaboré, blaming failures against jihadists . Damiba himself had received U.S. training and participated in American exercises . He initially assured France of partnership, but nine months later in September 2022, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré led a second coup, citing Damiba’s alleged closeness with France and inability to stem violence . Foreign Angle: The Traoré junta immediately pivoted to Russia – suspending France’s RFI radio, kicking out French commandos, and welcoming Wagner emissaries. It has since forged an explicit alliance with Mali and Niger against ECOWAS , indicating a consolidated anti-West bloc.
• Niger, July 2023: Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani, head of the presidential guard, overthrows President Mohamed Bazoum – a key Western ally in a very high-profile coup . The junta cited “deteriorating security” and immediately took a defiant anti-French stance . Crowds in Niamey waved Russian flags and chanted pro-Putin slogans, as noted earlier . Foreign Reactions: ECOWAS, with tacit French/U.S. support, threatened military intervention to reinstate Bazoum . In turn, Mali and Burkina Faso (now Niger’s fellow junta-led neighbors) vowed to come to Niger’s aid militarily if ECOWAS attacked . This raised the specter of a direct regional war – essentially West-backed ECOWAS vs. Russia-aligned juntas – a Cold War-like proxy standoff. Under intense diplomacy (and likely pressure from Washington to avoid chaos), ECOWAS paused an invasion, but the situation remains volatile. Meanwhile, Russia applauded ECOWAS’ failure to act, and there are unconfirmed reports of Wagner personnel deploying in Niger to advise the new regime.
• Gabon, August 2023: A military coup ousts President Ali Bongo just after a disputed election. Unlike the Sahel coups, Gabon’s had a different flavor – it ended a family’s 55-year rule but the junta there has been cautious. France, which has a base in Gabon, refrained from strong condemnation (perhaps seeing the coup as internally driven by a pro-French elite faction). There isn’t clear Russian or Chinese role here. However, Gabon’s coup still fits the pattern of a wave against entrenched incumbents, and it further shrinks France’s pool of friendly regimes. Notably, Gabon was suspended from the Commonwealth and African Union, showing even non-Francophone institutions’ concern over the coup contagion.

This chronology shows a clear trend: since 2020, coups have proliferated across West and Central Africa, often undoing Western-aligned governments and replacing them with military regimes that tilt towards new patrons. The presence of Russian Wagner or propaganda operations around these events is striking (Mali, Burkina, Niger). China’s influence is less directly tied to coups – Beijing tends to work with whoever is in power – but Chinese state media has often echoed Russian talking points blaming French neo-colonialism for Africa’s woes . The impact has been a strategic setback for Western diplomacy and a boon for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. It has also increased instability: democratic governance has been reversed in many states, and jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel have only grown in the turmoil (Mali and Burkina saw terrorist attacks escalate after expelling French forces, with Wagner proving unable to significantly curb militants).

It’s important to stress that African public sentiment has been a driving force in many coups. Corruption, poverty, and insecurity created a powder keg that foreign actors then ignited or steered. In Mali and Burkina, crowds initially welcomed soldiers seizing power, believing any change was better than the status quo. Russia skillfully channeled this anger toward France via social media, but the anger itself was homegrown – fueled by real casualties and frustration that years of Western-led military operations did not bring peace. Thus, while foreign meddling set the context and helped shape outcomes, the ultimate sustainability of these juntas will depend on delivering results to their people. If they fail, we could even see a backlash against Russia or China down the road. As one Nigerien protester told the BBC: “They’ve exploited all the riches of my country… The poorest Nigeriens can’t eat because of France.” – that raw sentiment could easily be directed at the new partners if they simply replace France in exploiting resources.

Foreign Manipulation: Covert Clues and Overt Indicators

Multiple pieces of evidence suggest major powers have been manipulating unrest and influencing regimes behind closed doors. Some of these indicators include:

• Disinformation Campaigns: As detailed earlier, Russia (via Wagner/Prigozhin assets) has run concerted fake news campaigns to destabilize governments and mold public opinion. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies documented that Russia was behind 40% of all documented disinformation campaigns in Africa, sponsoring at least 80 operations in over 20 countries . These campaigns have explicitly sought to “undermine democracy… promote coups… and stoke anti-Western sentiment” . In the case of Niger, Wagner-linked networks twice fabricated coup rumors (in 2022 and early 2023) to prime the environment , and then flooded the infosphere with pro-junta, anti-French propaganda once the coup occurred . Such meddling is analogous to the Cold War era of CIA-KGB intrigue, but in the digital age – using Facebook posts instead of radio broadcasts. France, in turn, has ramped up counter-disinformation: its foreign ministry’s monitoring unit traced a viral video falsely blaming France for a massacre in CAR to “accounts with links to Russian disinformation, including Wagner” . The European Union even sanctioned Wagner in 2023 for spreading disinfo and fomenting instability in Africa .
• Leaked Intelligence and Arms Deals: The trove of leaked U.S. intelligence documents (via Discord in 2023)revealed concrete plans by Russia to expand its influence militarily. One leaked report said Wagner was working to establish a training camp for rebels in Chad (aiming to topple the pro-French Chadian government) . Another indicated Wagner sought to procure Turkish weapons through Mali for use in Ukraine – effectively using its African foothold to evade arms embargoes . Western intel leaks also pointed at direct contacts between Malian officials and Wagner to acquire missiles, indicating a deepening clandestine partnership. On the Western side, investigative reports have uncovered that U.S. operatives quietly supported certain leaders – for example, the U.S. reportedly tried (unsuccessfully) to dissuade Mali’s 2020 coup plotters through backchannels, and likely shares real-time drone surveillance with Niger’s junta at present (despite officially condemning the coup). These hidden dealings show foreign powers playing both sides: publicly sanctioning juntas while privately engaging to safeguard interests (like counter-terrorism or uranium supply).
• Economic Pressure and Corporate Intrigue: Foreign manipulation isn’t just military – it’s economic. France’s Orano, after Niger’s coup, found itself essentially expropriated by the junta, which then entertained offers from Russia for the same uranium assets . The timing suggests a coordinated effort possibly encouraged by Moscow: within months of Bazoum’s ouster, Niger moved against the French miner, aligning with Russia’s known desire to muscle into Niger’s uranium sector . Similarly in Mali, the pressure on Barrick Gold and other Western miners (seizing shipments, detaining staff) could be seen as not just local revenue-maximizing, but also as a way to create openings for friendlier investors (perhaps from countries that have supported the junta politically). There are unconfirmed reports that Mali has discussed gold mining partnerships with Russian and Middle Eastern entities to replace Western firms under the new rules. The opacity of many mining contract changes raises suspicions of quid pro quo – i.e., a foreign backer aids the regime, and quietly gets a cut of the national gold company or a stake in a lucrative mine.
• Intelligence Operations and “False Flag” Incidents: The Sahel has seen murky incidents that both Russian and Western intelligence have been accused of. One example is the mysterious killing of nine Chinese miners in CAR in March 2023 – Russian media immediately blamed “French agents” trying to malign Wagner , while France denied and traced that narrative to Wagner itself. In Mali, the government (influenced by Wagner advisers) has repeatedly accused France of arming terrorists – claims for which no evidence emerged, and which analysts believe is propaganda to sever France’s remaining influence. Conversely, France and the U.S. have likely used their intelligence assets to undermine Wagner: there were reports (unconfirmed officially) that French agents helped broker intra-military rifts in Wagner-occupied CAR to erode Prigozhin’s control. Additionally, drone surveillance by France in Mali – aside from catching Wagner staging graves – could potentially be used to expose or target Wagner units if conflict escalated (France did fly drones over Niger after the coup to monitor Wagner movements).
• Political Sway and Financing of Factions: Western NGOs and media have documented instances of Russia funneling money to political movements and candidates in Africa. For example, a 2022 leak of documents (the “Centurion files”) showed a Prigozhin-linked group financing election campaigns of pro-Russian candidates in multiple African countries . On the other side, historically, France maintained networks of influence through secret campaign funding of Francophile African politicians (a system that came to light in scandals involving Elf Aquitaine in the 1990s). While Paris claims those days are over, it is plausible that France and allies still quietly support favorable technocrats or military officers to steer transitions. The ousted Niger President Bazoum, for instance, had very close ties with Washington and Paris – one reason the junta has refused to release him could be fear he’s an agent of Western interests. The line between genuine patriot and foreign proxy can blur: each side accuses African leaders allied with the other of being puppets. The truth in many cases is somewhere in between – local actors align with foreign powers that serve their interests, and vice versa.

Collectively, these evidences paint a picture of a “shadow war” in the Sahel. Unlike the U.S.-USSR Cold War in Africa which often involved large-scale proxy armies (think Cuba’s deployment in Angola, or CIA support to Mobutu), the current struggle is more insidious. It’s fought through media narratives, special forces and mercenaries, economic carrots/sticks, and the enabling of local coup-makers. The impact has been corrosive to state stability – leaders focus on courting or playing off foreign patrons instead of accountability to citizens. For instance, Mali’s regime, secure under Wagner’s wing, simply ignored ECOWAS sanctions and cracked down on domestic opponents and UN peacekeepers. Likewise, external support can embolden military adventurism (Niger’s Tchiani likely calculated that Russian backing and U.S. hesitance would shield him from external force). The risk is that foreign manipulation perpetuates a cycle of instability – coups beget more coups, as soldiers see that geopolitics will protect them from consequences as long as they pick a patron. This sentiment of impunity is dangerous. It may take a major misstep – say, Wagner overstretching or a junta mishandling an economic crisis – for the cycle to break.

France’s Recalibration Post-Power Losses in West Africa

For France in particular, the loss of influence in West Africa has prompted intense reflection and policy shifts. French foreign policy is undergoing a recalibration on several fronts:

• Military Drawdown and Redeployment: After ending Operation Barkhane, France has been consolidating its military presence in the region. Troops withdrawn from Mali and Burkina were repositioned to Niger and Chad – until Niger’s coup abruptly derailed that plan in 2023. Now, France’s footprint is largely limited to Djibouti (East Africa), a base in Chad, and coastal West Africa (Ivory Coast, Senegal). French officials speak of moving from a “direct intervention” posture to a lighter “support and partnership” model – offering training, intelligence, and equipment to African-led missions (such as the Accra Initiative to help Ghana, Togo, Benin secure their northern borders). Notably, France has supported the raise of a new ECOWAS standby force that could intervene in coup-hit states, a way for France to bolster regional policing of democracy without appearing as the frontman. However, with anti-French sentiments high, even these indirect efforts are fraught; Paris must be careful not to be seen as pulling strings. The French defense minister has also announced a review of all defense accords with African countries, aiming for ones that emphasize respect for sovereignty and joint decision-making.
• Economic and Development Adjustments: France is a major provider of development aid to its former colonies, often through the Agence Française de Développement (AFD). With Mali, Burkina, Niger now under sanctions, France suspended aid to those governments (while pledging to redirect some humanitarian support via NGOs). In the long run, France is trying to encourage French companies to diversify beyond traditional strongholds. TotalEnergies, for example, is focusing on Mozambique’s LNG and Namibia’s oil rather than the troubled Sahel. The French government is also pushing Francophone coastal countries (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin) as new economic hubs to invest in – effectively hedging against the “coup belt” by deepening ties with more stable neighbors. At the same time, Macron has talked about reforming the CFA franc arrangement – a move to remove a key symbol of neo-colonialism and thereby undercut a favorite critique of Russia/China. In 2022, the Eco currency(a planned West African currency to replace CFA) was delayed, but France agreed to loosen its control by ending the requirement that 50% of reserves be kept in France’s treasury. This kind of reform, Paris hopes, will take some sting out of accusations of economic stranglehold.
• Political & Cultural Engagement: France is leveraging its cultural assets – language, education, media – to maintain influence. Initiatives like offering more scholarships for African students, investing in French-language media content that actually addresses African issues (to counter Russian-funded outlets like Afrique Média), and high-profile visits are part of this charm offensive. President Macron has done multiple Africa tours where he held town hall meetings with youth, acknowledging mistakes of the past. For example, in a March 2023 trip to Kinshasa, he admitted France had sometimes “continued to have a colonial-type view” and said Africans must define their own partnerships . This rhetorical shift is aimed at rebuilding goodwill, though skeptics call it lip service.
• Intelligence and Counter-Terror Resilience: France’s DGSE and DRM (military intel) are adapting to having less on-ground presence. They are likely relying more on technology (drones, surveillance aircraft) and allied cooperation (with the U.S., and with Morocco, Algeria who have interests in Sahel stability) to monitor jihadist groups remotely. France has warned that the Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliates could exploit the void left by Barkhane’s end, potentially planning strikes on coastal West African states or Europe. Thus, French policy is now to help those coastal states build a preventive buffer to contain Sahel violence. We see enhanced support to Niger’s southern neighbors and an attempted rapprochement with Mali’s neighbor Algeria – because Algeria has influence on Mali’s junta and a capable army that could help counter terrorists if persuaded. Essentially, France is trying to assemble a coalition of the willing among African states to isolate the coup regimes and keep counter-terror pressure on without direct French deployment.

Overall, France post-power-loss is humbled but not irrelevant. It still wields UN Security Council clout and EU development funds; it is recalibrating to use these tools more and its military muscle less. Whether this strategy succeeds will depend on if France can truly listen to African partners’ needs and shed its patronizing reputation. If it cannot, any attempt to re-engage may be rebuffed, driving those countries further into alternative alliances.

Future Outlook: Conflict Flashpoints and Global Impact

Looking ahead, the future predictions emerging from this situation carry both hopeful possibilities and ominous risks. Fundamentally, the geopolitical tug-of-war in Africa’s Sahel is likely to intensify, with potential ramifications far beyond the continent. Here are key scenarios and conflicts to watch:

• Cold War Redux or New Multipolar Order? If current trends persist, Africa could effectively be split into spheres of influence. A Russia-China aligned bloc in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina, Niger, Guinea, maybe Sudan and others) may consolidate, while pro-West democracies (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, etc.) form a counter-group. We already see the nucleus of this: the Alliance of Sahel States binding the three junta-led neighbors in a defense pact explicitly arose against ECOWAS (which is backed by Western democracies) . This raises the prospect of proxy conflict: for instance, if ECOWAS were to intervene militarily in Niger (still on the table, however remote), it could spark a regional war drawing in Mali and Burkina (with tacit Russian support) against an ECOWAS coalition (with logistical backing from France/U.S.). Such a conflict could be devastating – effectively a West Africa civil war – and would deeply fragment the continent. While diplomacy has so far averted direct clash in Niger, the fundamental dispute – constitutional order versus military rule – remains unresolved. Prediction: We may see protracted standoffs rather than full-scale battles – e.g., ECOWAS maintaining sanctions on juntas for years, and juntas digging in with Russian help, creating frozen conflicts and further humanitarian crises.
• Major Power Intervention Unlikely, but Not Impossible: The U.S. and France have little appetite for direct military intervention (Western publics are weary of foreign entanglements). Russia and China also prefer low-cost influence to high-cost occupation. So a direct NATO vs Russia conflict on African soil is unlikely. However, accidents can happen: e.g., Wagner mercenaries might inadvertently clash with U.S. special forces or French troops. In 2018 in Syria, U.S. forces killed dozens of Russian Wagner contractors in self-defense – a scenario that could repeat in Africa if, say, Wagner units threaten a Western outpost or ally. Another risk is terror groups exploiting rivalry: if Western and Russian forces are focusing on outdoing each other, an ISIS or Boko Haram faction might launch a mass-casualty attack that forces emergency international action. For instance, if jihadists were to significantly penetrate a coastal state like Benin or Ivory Coast, France might feel compelled to intervene again, potentially upsetting the new status quo and leading to friction with Russia (should Wagner attempt to insert itself as well).
• Green Energy Scramble – Winners and Losers: The outcome of this silent war will have a direct impact on the global green energy revolution. Africa holds not just cobalt and lithium, but also manganese (Gabon, South Africa), graphite (Mozambique, Madagascar), rare earths (Tanzania, Burundi) – all critical for batteries, wind turbines, and electric vehicles. If China and Russia secure dominant control of these supply chains in Africa, Western industries could face bottlenecks and price shocks. Already, Western governments are anxious: the U.S. and EU have launched initiatives to counter China’s monopoly – for example, the U.S. has a “Minerals Security Partnership” seeking to invest in mines from Brazil to Tanzania, and the EU proposed an “Global Gateway” as an alternative to BRI for infrastructure. However, these efforts are nascent compared to China’s entrenched position. We could see tensions with Western corporations escalate: automobile and electronics manufacturers may lobby their governments to make deals even with juntas or rivals to secure minerals. This could undermine Western promotion of democracy if push comes to shove – e.g., a European company might push for rapprochement with Mali’s junta if that’s what it takes to access lithium deposits in the future. On the other hand, if Western firms are shut out, they will likely invest elsewhere (Latin America, Australia, Indonesia – which has large nickel and some cobalt resources). This could economically benefit those alternate suppliers but also create new environmental and social strains there.
• Resource Nationalism vs Foreign Exploitation: The newfound assertiveness of African states in controlling resources could lead to more nationalizations and renegotiations. As seen in Burkina and Mali, governments are willing to forcibly alter contracts. In the short term, this deters some foreign investment (who wants to pour money into a mine that might be seized?). But in the long term, it could push a new model where African states demand refining and value-add happen locally, not just shipping raw ore abroad. If managed well (a big “if”), this could spur local industries (for example, battery manufacturing in Africa using local lithium, cobalt, and graphite). China has adapted to this by agreeing to build processing plants (like a Chinese firm building a lithium refinery in Zimbabwe ). Western companies will need to adapt too or risk being edged out. The global transition to clean energy might thus see new alliances: perhaps African countries partnering with Asian manufacturers to produce components, reducing Western companies’ market share. This shift could inflame trade tensions – imagine the West imposing tariffs on “strategic minerals” or invoking security to block Chinese-African tech partnerships.
• Human Security and Migration: A less discussed but crucial impact of the Sahel power struggle is on humanitarian conditions. The Sahel is facing severe drought, food shortages, and violence that have displaced millions. If foreign competition exacerbates instability (as with the coups and Wagner’s mixed record on actually providing security), humanitarian crises will grow. This could result in increased migration flows northward, which in turn becomes a political issue in Europe. The EU might then engage more deeply in the Sahel out of self-interest to prevent a migrant surge – possibly cooperating with any stable authority regardless of its democratic legitimacy. For example, Italy has signaled willingness to work with the Niger junta on curbing migration, diverging from ECOWAS’s hard line. Such pragmatic but morally gray choices could cause rifts within Western alliances on how to handle the coup states.

On balance, the risk of a large-scale interstate war remains relatively low if diplomacy holds. The most likely near-term scenario is a continued stand-off in Niger (no ECOWAS intervention, but no recognition of the junta; a frozen crisis) and a deepening of proxy engagement: more Wagner presence in francophone Africa, more Western intelligence support to neighbors to contain juntas, and intense propaganda battles for public opinion. The impact on global green energy will be felt in supply chain strategies – expect Western nations to accelerate efforts to source critical minerals from friendly countries and invest in recycling to reduce dependency on conflict zones. We may also see higher global commodity prices for uranium, lithium, etc., if political risk in Africa spikes – which could slow down nuclear and renewable projects in the West, ironically undermining climate goals.

For Western corporations, there could be legal battles and insurance claims as their assets are expropriated or operations disrupted. Orano is already suing Niger’s regime over “confiscation of property” . Barrick and other miners are in arbitration with Mali. The outcomes of these cases will set precedents for how secure international investments are in the new era. If the companies lose, it might discourage future Western investment in those countries, leaving the field even more open to state-backed firms from the East that can absorb losses or play a longer strategic game.

In conclusion, the silent geopolitical struggle in Africa’s Sahel and sub-Saharan regions is reshaping alliances and access to critical resources in real time. Foreign powers – China, Russia, France, the U.S. – are all recalibrating their strategies, blending fundamental interests in minerals and security with informational and economic tools to win hearts, minds, and markets. The sentiments of African populations, increasingly assertive and conscious of neo-colonial patterns, are injecting volatility into this great game, sometimes aligning with one foreign partner against another, but ultimately seeking dignity and self-determination. The impact of this contest will be global: it will determine who controls the vast mineral wealth powering the 21st-century economy, how stable or unstable a broad swath of Africa will be, and whether principles of democracy and sovereignty or raw power politics define the coming era.

For countries like Indonesia, observing from afar, this is not just a distant drama – it is a lesson and an opportunity. In a world shifting to green energy, those who hold the keys (nickel, cobalt, lithium) will have newfound influence. Indonesia can glean from Africa’s experiences to harness its own resources wisely, avoid the pitfalls of becoming a pawn, and possibly emerge as a key node in a more multipolar, fairer global energy market – one where critical resources are not monopolized by a few, but traded for the benefit of many.

Sources: [UN, Amnesty and Reuters reports; The Africa Report; Al Jazeera; Le Monde Diplomatique investigations; leaked U.S. intelligence disclosed in media; Reuters timeline of coups ; Bloomberg and BBC reporting on resource contracts ; Africa Center for Strategic Studies analyses ; Reuters and AP dispatches from Niamey and Bamako ; official statements from French government and Wagner-linked sources.]